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Abstract
In this paper, the individual secrecy of two-way wiretap channel is investigated, where two legitimate users’ messages are
separately guaranteed secure against an external eavesdropper. For one thing, in some communication scenarios, the joint secrecy
is impossible to achieve both positive secrecy rates of two users. For another, the individual secrecy satisfies the secrecy demand of
many practical communication systems. Thus, firstly, an achievable secrecy rate region is derived for the general two-way wiretap
channel with individual secrecy. In a deterministic channel, the region with individual secrecy is shown to be larger than that with
joint secrecy. Secondly, outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region are obtained for the general two-way wiretap channel and
for two classes of special two-way wiretap channels. The gap between inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region is
explored via the binary input two-way wiretap channels and the degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap. Most notably, the secrecy
capacity regions are established for the XOR channel and the degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channel. Furthermore, the
secure sum-rate of the degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channel under the individual secrecy constraint is demonstrated to be
strictly larger than that under the joint secrecy constraint.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the wide usage of the wireless networks nowadays, the security of wireless communication has become a crucial
issue. Due to the open nature of the wireless channel, the wireless links are more vulnerable to eavesdropping. However, in
the dynamic wireless network, the traditional cryptography faces many challenges in handling the security problem, such as
complex key distribution and management. By contrast, information theoretic secrecy guarantees secure communication against
the eavesdropper even with unlimited computational power. In 1975, Wyner [1] introduced information theoretic secrecy to a
noisy degraded broadcast channel and demonstrated that secure communication is possible without any shared key beforehand.
Thereafter, information theoretic secrecy, a more powerful approach to wireless secure transmission, has attracted intensive
attention [2]–[6].
As one of the classic multi-user channels, two-way channel models a large range of bidirectional communications, where two
users exchange messages with each other through a common channel. For instance, two users talk with each other simultaneously
via a full-duplex telephone networks; the power control centre (e.g. electricity company) interchanges information with the
user via a smart grid network. The reliable communication of two-way channel was first studied by Shannon in [7], where
inner and outer bounds on channel capacity region were presented. Later, Tekin and Yener [8] investigated the security along
with reliability of the two-way channel in the presence of an external eavesdropper, which is referred to the two-way wiretap
channel. Mainly, the two-way wiretap channel is explored in two secrecy criteria. One is the weak secrecy, requiring that the
rate of information leakage to the eavesdropper vanishes. For the two-way wiretap channel with weak secrecy, both inner and
outer bounds on the secrecy capacity were obtained. For the inner bound on the secrecy capacity, Tekin and Yener [8]–[10]
and El Gamal et al. [11] respectively derived the achievable secrecy rate region for the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel and
the general two-way wiretap channel. Specifically, reference [11] improves the results in [8]–[10] by a hybrid coding scheme
combining the cooperative jamming and secret-key exchange mechanism. The outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the
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2degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channel was studied in [12]. The other secrecy criterion is the strong secrecy, demanding
that the information leakage to the eavesdropper, rather than the leakage rate, goes to zero. Regarding to the difficulty of
studying strong secrecy, as we know, only Pierrot et al. [13] provided an achievable secrecy rate region with the strong secrecy
of the general two-way wiretap channel.
So far, all the previous works on no matter weak secrecy or strong secrecy focus on the joint secrecy of two-way wiretap
channel, assuring security of two legitimate users’ confidential messages together. However, if either of the legitimate users’
outputs is a degraded version of the eavesdropper’s output, achieving positive secrecy rates at both legitimate users is impossible
with the joint secrecy (the details will be explained in the Lemma 1 in Section II). Such scenario is quite common, for instance
the eavesdropper stays closer to the transmitter than the receiver does, as a result the legitimate receiver encounters more
interferences and noises through the long distance transmission than the eavesdropper does. To achieve positive secrecy rates
at both legitimate users, we introduce the individual secrecy of the two-way wiretap channel. Roughly speaking, individual
secrecy requires that the rate of information leakage from each confidential message to the eavesdropper is made vanish.
Comparatively, individual secrecy can be achieved by positive secrecy rates at both legitimate users. In fact, the individual
secrecy constraint is also practical in other scenarios [14], [15]. For example, the secrecy criterion with the same definition
is proposed in a multicast network [14], where a source node sends a set of message packets through the multicast network
to the destination. The security in [14] requires that wiretapper gains no information about each packet, while still potentially
obtains no meaningful information about the source. Under this secrecy constraint, the multicast capacity can be achieved [14].
Whereas, if the information leakage of all the packets goes to zero (the joint secrecy), it is impossible to achieve the multicast
capacity [16]. Thus, the individual secrecy gains an advantage over the joint secrecy in [14].
Based on the analysis above, we investigate the individual secrecy of the two-way wiretap channel in this paper. Firstly,
we derive an achievable secrecy rate region of the general two-way wiretap channel under the individual secrecy constraint.
In order to illustrate the intuition of the result, a deterministic channel is provided to show that the achievable secrecy rate
region under the individual secrecy constraint is strictly larger than that with the joint secrecy in [11]. Secondly, outer bounds
on the secrecy capacity region are established for the general two-way wiretap channel and for two classes of special two-way
wiretap channels. Further, the gap between the inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region is explored via two cases:
the binary input two-way wiretap channels and the degraded Gaussian channel. Most notably, we obtain the secrecy capacity
region of the degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channel under individual secrecy constraint. To the best of our knowledge,
it is the first time to determine the secrecy capacity region for any kind of two-way wiretap channel in the literature.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we introduce the two-way wiretap channel with the individual
secrecy. In Section III, we present our results of the general two-way wiretap channel with the individual secrecy. A deterministic
two-way wiretap channel is also given to illustrate the intuition behind the results. In Section IV, we investigate binary-input
two-way wiretap channels and the degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channel with the individual secrecy. In the final section,
we give the conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Before discussing the system model, note that in this paper, we use capital letters, lower case letters and calligraphic letters to
denote the random variables, sample values and alphabets, respectively. A similar convention is applied to the random vectors
and their sample values. For example, Xn denotes a random n-vector (X1, X2, · · · , Xn), and xn is a sample vector value in
Xn.
In this paper, we study the two-way wiretap channel as shown in Fig. 1, where two legitimate users intend to exchange
confidential messages with each other in the presence of an external eavesdropper. Particularly, we focus on the full-duplex
scenario, where each of the legitimate users can send and receive messages simultaneously on the same degree of freedom.
Suppose W1s, W2s are two message sets; X1, X2 are the finite channel input alphabets at user 1 and user 2; Y1, Y2, Z are
the channel output alphabets at user 1, user 2 and the eavesdropper, respectively. The discrete memoryless two-way wiretap
channel is characterized by the transition probability distribution p(y1, y2, z|x1, x2), where x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2 are the channel
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Fig. 1: Two-way channel with an external eavesdropper.
inputs from user 1 and 2; y1 ∈ Y1, y2 ∈ Y2 and z ∈ Z are channel outputs at user 1, user 2 and the eavesdropper. More
specifically, the legitimate user i wants to transmit a confidential message Wi ∈ Wi to the other user. The corresponding
codeword Xni ∈ Xi is sent at a transmission rate Ris = 1nH(Wis) for i = 1, 2. The channel output are Y ni ∈ Yi and Zn ∈ Z
at at user i and the eavesdropper, respectively.
For such a two-way wiretap channel, a (2nR1s , 2nR2s , n) code consists of:
• Two independent message sets W1s = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR1s}, W2s = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR2s}.
• Two messages: W1s and W2s are independent and uniformly distributed over W1s and W2s, respectively.
• Two encoders f1 : W1s → Xn1 , which map each message w1s ∈ W1s to a codeword xn1 ∈ Xn1 ; f2 : W2s → Xn2 , which
map each message w2s ∈ W2s to a codeword xn2 ∈ Xn2 .
• Two decoders g1 : (Yn1 ,Xn1 ) → Wˆ2s, which map the received sequence yn1 and the sequence xn1 to a message wˆ2s;
g2 : (Yn2 ,Xn2 )→ Wˆ1s, which map the received sequence yn2 and the sequence xn2 to a message wˆ1s.
For a given code, two metrics should be sufficed: reliability and security. The reliability is measured by the average error
probabilities of decoding at legitimate user 1 and 2, defined as
Pe,1 =
1
2nR2s
2nR2s∑
W2s=1
Pr{Wˆ2s 6=W2s};
Pe,2 =
1
2nR1s
2nR1s∑
W1s=1
Pr{Wˆ1s 6=W1s}. (1)
The individual security in this paper is defined by
1
n
I(W1s;Z
n) ≤ τn, 1
n
I(W2s;Z
n) ≤ τn, lim
n→∞ τn = 0, (2)
Definition 1. The rate pair (R1s, R2s) is said to be achievable under the individual secrecy with R1s = 1nH(W1s), R2s =
1
nH(W2s), if there exists a (2
nR1s , 2nR2s , n) code such that
Pe,i ≤ n, for i = 1, 2 (3)
1
n
I(W1s;Z
n) ≤ τn, 1
n
I(W2s;Z
n) ≤ τn, (4)
lim
n→∞ n = 0 and limn→∞ τn = 0. (5)
Note that (3) indicates the reliability transmission constraint; (4) is the individual secrecy constraint.
Remark 1. For the joint weak secrecy (joint secrecy for short in this paper) in [9], [11], the rate of information leakage rate
of both the messages W1s and W2s is demanded vanishing, i.e.
1
n
I(W1s,W2s;Z
n) ≤ τn, lim
n→∞ τn = 0. (6)
4If the coding schemes fulfill the (3), (5), and the joint secrecy constraint (6), then the rate pair (R1s, R2s) is said to be
achievable under the joint secrecy constraint with R1s = 1nH(W1s), R2s =
1
nH(W2s).
However, the joint secrecy is not always affordable, such as the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Assume that in the two-way wiretap channels, the legitimate received symbol Y1 or Y2 is a degraded version of
the received symbol Z at eavesdropper, i.e. (X1, X2)→ Z → Y1 or (X1, X2)→ Z → Y2 forms a Markov chain. Then, with
the joint secrecy, the achievable secure transmission rates pair (R1s, R2s) with R1s > 0, R2s > 0 is not available, while with
the individual secrecy constraint, it is available with the R1s > 0, R2s > 0.
Proof 1. The information leakage of two messages W1s and W2s are
H(W1s,W2s|Zn) =H(W1s|Zn) +H(W2s|W1sZn)
(a)
≤H(W1s|Zn) +H(W2s|W1sY n1 )
(b)
≤H(W1s|Zn) + nn
≤H(W1s) + nn
=nR1s + nn (7)
where (a) follows from the degraded assumption that Y1 is a degraded version of Z; (b) follows from the reliability transmission
condition and Fano’s inequality with lim
n→∞ n = 0.
• For the joint secrecy constraint
1
n
I(W1s,W2s;Z
n) ≤ τn, lim
n→∞ τn = 0,
we can obtain that
n(R1s +R2s) =H(W1s,W2s)
=H(W1s,W2s|Zn) + I(W1s,W2s;Zn)
(c)
≤H(W1s,W2s|Zn) + nτn
(d)
≤nR1s + nn + nτn
where (d) follows from the joint secrecy constraint; (d) follows from (7). That is
nR2s ≤nn + nτn (8)
As n goes to infinity (i.e. n→∞ ), according to (5), we have lim
n→∞ n = 0, limn→∞ τn = 0. Therefore, by (8) we have
R2s ≤ 0. (9)
Similarly, if Y2 is a degraded version of Z, then R1s ≤ 0.
• For the individual secrecy constraint
1
n
I(W1s;Z
n) ≤ τn, 1
n
I(W2s;Z
n) ≤ τn, lim
n→∞ τn = 0. (10)
we have
n(R1s +R2s) =H(W1s,W2s)
=H(W1s,W2s|Zn) + I(W1s,W2s;Zn)
(d)
≤nR1s + nn + I(W1s;Zn) + I(W2s;Zn|W1s)
(e)
≤nR1s + nn + nτn + I(W2s;Zn|W1s)
5where (d) follows from (7); (e) follows from the individual secrecy constraint (10).
As n→∞, according to (5), that is
R2s ≤ I(W2s;Zn|W1s). (11)
Similarly, R1s ≤ I(W1s;Zn|W2s). Therefore, the individual secrecy can achieve both positive transmission rates pair
(R1s, R2s). Moreover, if Y1 is a degraded version of Z, we have I(W2s;Zn|W1s) ≥ I(W2s;Y n1 |W1s). This illustrates
that R2s could even achieve I(W2s;Y n1 |W1s).
In summary, if Y1 or Y2 is a degraded version of Z, the achievable secure transmission rates pair (R1s > 0, R2s > 0) is not
available under the joint secrecy constraint, while it is possible under the individual secrecy constraint. In the next section, we
will give the exact achievable secrecy rate region of two-way wiretap channel with individual secrecy.
III. INDIVIDUAL SECRECY OF TWO-WAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we present our main results of two-way wiretap channel with individual secrecy. Firstly, we derive an
achievable secrecy rate region of the general two-way wiretap channel, further give an intuitive interpretation of the result in
a deterministic two-way wiretap channel. Secondly, we give an outer bound on the secrecy capacity.
A. An achievable secrecy rate region
Theorem 1. For the two-way wiretap channels with an external eavesdropper, an achievable secrecy rate region is given by
RInd−In M= convex closure of {
⋃
p∈P
RInd−In(p)}
where P denotes the set of all distribution of the random variables U1, U2, X1, X2 satisfying p(u1u2x1x2) = p(u1)p(u2)p(x1|u1)p(x2|u2);
RInd−In(p) is the region of rate pairs (R1s, R2s) for p ∈ P , satisfying
(R1s, R2s) :
R1s ≥ 0, R2s ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ I(U1;Y2|X2)− I(U1;Z)− |I(U2;Z|U1)− I(U2;Y1|X1)|+,
R2s ≤ I(U2;Y1|X1)− I(U2;Z)− |I(U1;Z|U2)− I(U1;Y2|X2)|+.

(12)
and |a|+ = max{0, a}, |U1| ≤ |X1|+ 1, |U2| ≤ |X2|+ 1.
Proof: See the proof in Appendix B.
Our achievable region is obtained by the stochastic encoding and the channel prefixing, where the codeword U1 and U2 are
drawn from two binning codebooks respectively, and then passed on to two virtual prefix channel respectively. Accordingly,
the channel input X1 and X2 are generated regarding to p(x1|u1) and p(x2|u2), respectively. Indeed, the channel prefixing is
an interpretation of cooperative jamming [17], which is a collaborative approach to improving the secrecy rate in a multi-user
communication system.
Specially, since Z is related to X1 and X2 together, if the eavesdropper can decode part of message of user 2, it may
help the eavesdropper to decode the confidential message W1s. Hence, when analyzing the individual secrecy of W1s, if
R2 ≥ I(U2;Z|U1) then the codebook of user 2 is equally partitioned into 2R21 sub-codebooks with R21 = R2−I(U2;Z|U1)+′,
each part consisting of 2R22 codewords with R22 = I(U2;Z|U1)− ′. The secrecy analysis of W2s works in a similar manner.
Remark 2. It is worth noting that R1s and R2s meet the conditions individually in (12). This phenomenon can be interpreted
by considering the reliability and the individual secrecy of the system. Firstly, for the reliability, the rate pair (R1s, R2s)
should satisfy the achievable rate region given by Shannon in [7], where R1s and R2s meet each condition separately with
no trade-off between R1s and R2s. Secondly, for the individual secrecy, R1s and R2s should meet 1nI(W1s;Z) ≤ τn and
1
nI(W2s;Z) ≤ τn, respectively. Therefore, as shown in Theorem 1, R1s and R2s are not directly interrelated with each other.
6Unlike the individual secrecy, the results in [11] revealed a trade-off between R1s and R2s with the joint secrecy. This is
because the joint secrecy constraint 1nI(W1s,W2s;Z) ≤ τn is related to both R1s and R2s at the same time.
Applying Theorem 1 to a two-way wiretap channel where the eavesdropper receives as many messages as the legitimate
users, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose that in the two-way wiretap channel the legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper receive the same
amount of messages, i.e. Y1 = Y2 = Z, an achievable secrecy rate region with individual secrecy is given by
RInd−In1 M= convex closure of {
⋃
p∈P
RInd−In1 (p)},
where P denotes the set of all distribution of the random variables X1, X2 satisfying p(x1x2) = p(x1)p(x2). RInd−In1 (p) is
the region of rate pairs (R1s, R2s) for p ∈ P , satisfying
(R1s, R2s) :
R1s ≥ 0, R2s ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X1;Z),
R2s ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1)− I(X2;Z).

(13)
Proof. Setting U1 = X1 and U2 = X2 in (12), then
R1s ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X1;Z)− |I(X2;Z|X1)− I(X2;Z|X1)|+
= I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X1;Z)
Similarly, R2s ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1)− I(X2;Z). This completes the proof.
Remark 3. With the joint secrecy, if Y1 = Y2 = Z and U1 = X1, U2 = X2, the achievable secrecy rate region [11] is
RJ−In1 M= convex closure of {
⋃
p∈P
RJ−In1 (p)},
where P denotes the set of all distribution of the random variables X1, X2 satisfying p(x1x2) = p(x1)p(x2). RJ−In1 (p) is
the region of rate pairs (R1s, R2s) for p ∈ P , satisfying
(R1s, R2s) :
R1s ≥ 0, R2s ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1),
R2s ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2),
R1s +R2s ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1) + I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X1, X2;Z).

(14)
Note that, the last equation can be rewritten as
R1s +R2s ≤I(X2;Y1|X1) + I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X1, X2;Z)
=I(X2;Y1|X1)− I(X2;Z) (15)
or
R1s +R2s ≤ R1s +R2s ≤I(X1;Z|X2)− I(X1;Z) (16)
By comparing (13) with (15) and (16), either R1s or R2s with individual secrecy is equal to the sum-rate R1s +R2s with
the joint secrecy, which indicates that the secrecy rate region RJ−In1 with the joint secrecy is only half of the secrecy rate
region RInd−In1 with the individual secrecy.
7B. An interpretation of Theorem 1 in a deterministic two-way wiretap channel
In this subsection, a deterministic two-way wiretap channel is studied to illustrate the intuition of the achievable secrecy
rate region in Theorem 1. Suppose that the deterministic two-way wiretap channel is described by
Y1 =X1 ⊕X2 ⊕N1;
Y2 =X1 ⊕X2 ⊕N2;
Z =X1 ⊕X2 ⊕Ne;
where X1, X2, N1, N2, Ne ∈ {0, 1}; X1 and X2 are the binary channel inputs at user 1 and user 2, respectively; Y1, Y2 and
Z are the binary channel outputs at the user 1, user 2 and the eavesdropper, respectively; N1, N2, Ne are the additive binary
noise impairing user 1, user 2 and the eavesdropper, respectively. Then, the corresponding transition probabilities are given by
p(N1 = 1) = ε1, p(N2 = 1) = ε2 and p(Ne = 1) = εz . Therefore, the transmission probabilities are
p(y1 6= x2|x1) =ε1;
p(y2 6= x1|x2) =ε2;
p(z 6= x1 ⊕ x2|x1, x2) =εz.
If the system does not have any eavesdropper, the model is reduced to a binary modulo-2 two-way channel that provides
the reliability only.
Lemma 2 ( [7]). For the full-duplex binary modulo-2 two-way channel, the achievable reliable transmit rate region R is the
union of non-negative rate pairs (R1, R2) defined by
R1 ≤1− h(ε2),
R2 ≤1− h(ε1).
For the joint secrecy of the binary modulo-2 two-way wiretap channel, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 ( [11]). For the full-duplex binary modulo-2 two-way wiretap channel with the joint secrecy, the achievable secrecy
rate region RJoint−Ins is the union of non-negative rate pairs (R1s, R2s) defined by
R1s ≤1− h(ε2),
R2s ≤1− h(ε1),
R1s +R2s ≤1 + h(εz)− h(ε1)− h(ε2). (17)
On the other hand, according to Theorem 1, the achievable secrecy rate region with the individual secrecy is given in the
following corollary.
Lemma 4. For the full-duplex binary modulo-2 two-way wiretap channel with the individual secrecy, the achievable secrecy
rate region RInd−Ins is the union of non-negative rate pairs (R1s, R2s) defined by
R1s ≤ 1− h(ε2),
R2s ≤ 1− h(ε1).
Proof: See the proof of Corollary 2, 3 and 4 in Appendix A.
It is clear from Lemma 2, 3 and 4 that the achievable rate region R is the same as RInd−Ins , while RJoint−Ins is smaller
than RInd−Ins with regard to the sum-rate constraint (17). We conclude the result in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For the deterministic modulo-2 two-way wiretap channel, the achievable reliable transmit rate region R, the
achievable secrecy rate region RJoint−Ins with the joint secrecy, and RInd−Ins with the individual secrecy satisfy
RJoint−Ins ⊆ RInd−Ins = R.
8From the practical viewpoint, Theorem 2 reveals a great advantage of the individual secrecy that it can be achieved without
any rate loss of the reliable transmission rate, yet there is a rate loss for the joint secrecy.
R2s
R1s
0 1− h(ε1)
1− h(ε2)
R
RInd−Ins
RJoint−Ins
(a) h(εz) > h(ε1), h(ε2)
R2s
R1s
0 1− h(ε1)
1− h(ε2)
R
RInd−Ins
RJoint−Ins
(b) h(ε2) < h(εz) ≤ h(ε1)
R2s
R1s
0 1− h(ε1)
1− h(ε2)
R
RInd−Ins
RJoint−Ins
(c) h(ε1) < h(εz) ≤ h(ε2)
R2s
R1s
0 1− h(ε1)
1− h(ε2)
R
RInd−Ins
RJoint−Ins
(d) h(εz) < h(ε1), h(ε2)
Fig. 2: R, RJoint−Ins , RIndi−Ins of binary modulo-2 two-way channel.
The geometric structures of R, RJoint−Ins and RInd−Ins are depicted by four cases regarding to the value of h(ε1), h(ε2)
and h(εz) in Fig. 2, where the boundary of R, RJoint−Ins and RInd−Ins are plotted by the solid line, the dashed-dotted line
and the dashed line, respectively. In Fig. 2, R coincides with RInd−Ins as a rectangle, and RJoint−Ins contains a missing
corner due to the constraint R1s + R2s ≤ 1 + h(εz)− h(ε1)− h(ε2) in Lemma 3. Clearly, the individual secrecy provides a
strictly larger secrecy rates region than the joint secrecy does, especially in the high rates region of R1s and R2s.
C. An outer bound on the secrecy capacity of two-way wiretap channels with individual secrecy
Theorem 3. For the general two-way wiretapper channel, with the individual secrecy, an outer bound on the secrecy capacity
is given by
RInd−O M= Conv{
⋃
p∈P
RInd−O(p)},
where P denotes the set of all distribution of the random variables U , V , X1, X2 satisfying p(uv1v2x1x2) = p(u)p(v1|u)p(v2|u)
p(x1x2|uv1v2); U , V1 and V2 are the auxiliary random variables and U → (V1, V2)→ (X1, X2)→ (Y1, Y2, Z) forms a Markov
9Chain, and RInd−O is the region of rate pairs (R1s, R2s) for p ∈ P , satisfying
(R1s, R2s) :
R1s ≥ 0, R2s ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ I(V1;X2, Y2|U)− I(V1;Z|U),
R2s ≤ I(V2;X1, Y1|U)− I(V2;Z|U),

(18)
the cardinality of the auxiliary random variables U , V1 and V2 satisfies |U| ≤ |X1||X2| + 2, |V1| ≤ (|X1||X2| + 2)2 and
|V2| ≤ (|X1||X2|+ 2)2.
Proof: See the proof in Appendix C.
The outer bound (18) works for the general two-way wiretap channel with individual secrecy. Further, an outer bound derived
for two classes of two-way channels in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For the following two classes of two-way wiretapper channels,
1) the legitimate users and the eavesdropper receive the same amount of messages, i.e. Y1 = Y2 = Z = Y ;
2) the received message Z at the eavesdropper is a degraded version of both the messages at legitimate users, satisfying
the Markov chain Y1 → Z and Y2 → Z;
an outer bound on the secrecy capacity is given by
RInd−O1 M= {
⋃
p∈P
RInd−O1 (p)},
where P denotes the set of all distribution of the random variables Q, X1, X2 with p(qx1x2), and RInd−O(p) is the region
of rate pairs (R1s, R2s) for p ∈ P , satisfying
(R1s, R2s) :
R1s ≥ 0, R2s ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2, Q)− I(X1;Z|Q),
R2s ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(X2;Z|Q).

(19)
the cardinality of the auxiliary random variables Q satisfies |Q| ≤ |X1||X2|+ 1.
Proof: See the proof in Appendix D.
Remark 4. Later, Corollary 1 and Theorem 4 will be applied into the binary input two-way wiretap channels to show the gap
between the inner and the outer bound on the secrecy capacity. Specially, for a degraded Gaussian channel we will proof that
the inner bound in Theorem 1 and the outer bound in Theorem 4 coincide with each other, such that the secrecy capacity is
fully established.
IV. BINARY INPUT TWO-WAY WIRETAP CHANNEL AND DEGRADED GAUSSIAN TWO-WAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
A. Binary input two-way wiretap channel with individual secrecy
In this subsection, we are interested in the binary input two-way wiretap channels when the legitimate users and the
eavesdropper have the same channel output, i.e. Y1 = Y2 = Z. As Shannon utilized the binary multiplying channel (BMC) to
indicate the gap between the inner bound and the outer bound on the channel capacity of two-way channel, we also explore our
main results in BMC to show the gap between the inner and the outer bound on the secrecy capacity. Considering the binary-
input (i.e., x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}) and binary-output (i.e., y1 = y2 = z ∈ {0, 1}) or ternary outputs (i.e., y1 = y2 = z ∈ {0, 1, 2})
transmission, the XOR channel and the Adder channel are also investigated.
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For each channel, the achievable secrecy rate region RInd−In and the outer bound on the secrecy capacity RInd−O are
derived from Corollary 1 and Theorem 4, respectively. For simplicity, we define the following operation
a ∗ b := a(1− b) + (1− a)b, for 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1
and the entropy function
h(a) :=
{
−a log a− (1− a) log(1− a), if 0 < a < 1
0, if a = 0 or 1.
(20)
x1
x2
0 1
0
1
0 0
0 1
(a)
x1
x2
0 1
0
1
0 1
1 0
(b)
x1
x2
0 1
0
1
0 1
1 2
(c)
Fig. 3: Transition diagrams of the binary-input two-way channels.
1) Binary Multiplying channel: The BMC is shown in Fig. 3 (a), where the channel output is represented by Y1 = Y2 =
Z = X1 ·X2. By Corollary 1, the achievable secrecy rate region RInd−InBMC for BMC with individual secrecy is the union of
the following non-negative rate pair (R1s, R2s) over X1 ∼ Bern(p1), X2 ∼ Bern(p2):
R1s ≤ p2h(p1) + p1h(p2)− h(p1p2),
R2s ≤ p2h(p1) + p1h(p2)− h(p1p2).
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
R2s
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
R
1s
RInd!OBMC
RInd!InBMC
RJ!InBMC
Fig. 4: Secrecy rate region of BMC channel.
The achievable secrecy rate region RInd−InBMC and the outer bound RInd−OBMC are shown in Fig. 4. Additionally, the achievable
secrecy rate region with the joint secrecy RJ−InBMC is also plotted for comparison. The numerical results in Fig. 4 demonstrate
that the region RInd−InBMC is twice as large as RJ−InBMC , consistent with Remark 3. Moreover, it can be seen that the increase in R2s
leads to the decrease in R1s on RJ−InBMC , while R1s and R2s are greatly improved and achieve high secrecy rate simultaneously
on RInd−InBMC . However, the gap between RInd−InBMC and RInd−OBMC is still large.
2) Binary XOR channel: The XOR channel is shown in Fig. 3 (b), where the channel output is represented by Y1 = Y2 =
Z = X1 ⊕X2. By Corollary 1, the achievable secrecy rate region RInd−InXOR for XOR with individual secrecy is the union of
the following non-negative rate pair (R1s, R2s) over X1 ∼ Bern(p1), X2 ∼ Bern(p2):
R1s ≤ h(p1) + h(p2)− h(p1 ∗ p2),
R2s ≤ h(p1) + h(p2)− h(p1 ∗ p2).
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Fig. 5: Secrecy rate region of XOR channel.
Correspondingly, the achievable secrecy rate region with individual secrecy RInd−InXOR , with the joint secrecy RJ−InXOR and
the outer bound RInd−OXOR with individual secrecy are shown in Fig. 5. Clearly, RJ−InXOR is only half the size of RInd−InXOR .
Especially, the maximum achievable secrecy rate on RInd−InXOR is (R1s, R2s) = (1, 1), which is also the maximum reliable
rate without secrecy [7]. It indicates that the individual secrecy can be achieved with no rate loss of reliable transmission.
Moreover, RInd−IXOR coincides with RInd−OXOR , hence the individual secrecy capacity region of XOR channel is fully characterized
with (R1s ≤ 1, R2s ≤ 1).
3) Adder channel: The XOR channel is shown in Fig. 3 (c), where the channel output is represented by Y1 = Y2 = Z =
X1 +X2. By Corollary 1, the achievable secrecy rate region RInd−InAdder for the binary Adder channel with individual secrecy
is the union of the following non-negative rate pair (R1s, R2s) over X1 ∼ Bern(p1), X2 ∼ Bern(p2):
R1s ≤ (p1 ∗ p2)h
(
p1(1− p2)
p1 ∗ p2
)
,
R2s ≤ (p1 ∗ p2)h
(
p2(1− p1)
p1 ∗ p2
)
.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
R2s
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
R
1s
RInd!OAdder
RInd!InAdder
RJ!InAdder
Fig. 6: Secrecy rate region of Adder channel.
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Correspondingly, with individual secrecy, the achievable secrecy rate region RInd−InAdder and the outer bound RInd−OAdder are
drawn in Fig. 6, where the achievable secrecy rate region with the joint secrecy RJ−InAdder is also plotted for comparison. As in
BMC and XOR channel, in Adder channel RInd−InAdder is twice as large as RJ−InAdder. Moreover, for the individual secrecy, the
gap between RInd−IAdder and RInd−OAdder has narrowed considerably than that of the BMC.
B. Degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channel with individual secrecy
In this subsection, we study a class of degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channels with individual secrecy. We first define
two classes of degraded channels.
In the two-way wiretap channel, suppose the channel inputs of the two users are x1 and x2, respectively; the channel output
at the users and the eavesdropper are y1, y2 and z, respectively.
Definition 2. The two-way wiretap channel is physically degraded if the transition probability distribution satisfies
p(z, y1|x1, x2) = p(y1|x1, x2)p(z|y1). (21)
Definition 3. The two-way wiretap channel is physically degraded if the conditional marginal distribution is the same as that
of a physically degraded two-way wiretap channel, i.e., there exists a distribution p(z|y1) such that
p(z|x1, x2) =
∑
y1
p(y1|x1, x2)p(z|y1). (22)
Assume that the channel is discrete and memoryless, and the channel outputs at the legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper
are corrupted by additive Gaussian noise terms. Then, the channel outputs at each time i are given by
Y1i =X1i +X2i + Z1i; (23a)
Y2i =X1i +X2i + Z2i; (23b)
Zi =X1i +X2i + Zei; (23c)
where Z1i, Z2i and Zei are independent zero-meaning additive Gaussian noises with Z1i ∼ N{0, N1}, Z2i ∼ N{0, N2},
Zei ∼ N{0, Ne}, and Ne > N1, Ne > N2. The average power constraints of the channel input sequences Xn1 and Xn2 are
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X21i] ≤ P1 and
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X22i] ≤ P2. (24)
Under the assumption Ne > N1, the output Z is a stochastically degraded version of Y1, since the marginal distribution
p(z|x1, x2) is the same as that of the following physical degraded Gaussian two-way channel:
Y1i =X1i +X2i + Z1i; (25)
Zi =X1i +X2i + Z1i + Z
′
1i; (26)
where Z ′1i is independent of Z1i, being zero-meaning Gaussian noises with variance Zei−Z1i. Similarly, under the assumption
Ne > N2, the output Z is a stochastically degraded version of Y2.
We have the fundamental limits of the degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channel with individual secrecy in the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. For the degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channel with the individual secrecy, if the received symbol Z at
eavesdropper is a stochastically degraded version of the received symbol Y1 and Y2 at the legitimate users, the secrecy capacity
is given by
RInd−cGTW M=

(R1s, R2s) :
R1s ≥ 0, R2s ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ 1
2
log
(P1 +N2)(P2 +Ne)
N2(P1 + P2 +Ne)
,
R2s ≤ 1
2
log
(P2 +N1)(P1 +Ne)
N1(P1 + P2 +Ne)
.

(27)
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Proof: See Appendix E.
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Fig. 7: the secrecy capacity of the degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channel with the individual secrecy and the achievable
secrecy rate region with the joint secrecy, with N1 = 2, N2 = 2, Ne = 3, P1 = 300, P2 = 300.
In Fig. 7, we plot RInd−cGTW and the achievable secrecy rate region RJoint−IGTW with the joint secrecy for N1 = 2, N2 = 2, Ne =
3, P1 = 300, P2 = 300. Firstly, on RInd−cGTW , R1s and R2s achieve high rate region simultaneously, i.e. R1s = 3.1228, R1s =
3.1228. However, R1s and R2s can not achieve such high rate simultaneously as on RJoint−IGTW , where if R1s is as high as
R1s = 3.1228, then the R2s is only R2s = 0.2901. Secondly, in lower secrecy rate region R2s < 0.2901, the joint secrecy
offers higher secrecy rate R1s than the individual secrecy does. This is because that two confidential messages are guaranteed
secure under the joint secrecy constraint 1nI(W1s,W2s;Z
n) ≤ τn which is referred to R1s and R1s together. By sacrificing
the rate R2s, the secrecy rate R1s can be improved, even achieving the (R1s)max = 3.4129, R2s = 0. Nevertheless, the
individual secrecy provides higher secrecy sum-rate R1s + R2s than the joint secrecy does. From Fig. 7, it can be seen
(R1s+R2s)Ind = 6.2456 for the individual secrecy and (R1s+R2s)Joint = 3.4129 for the joint secrecy, which indicates that
the sum-rate R1s +R2s with individual secrecy is much larger than that with joint secrecy. Actually, the maximum sum-rate
R1s +R2s on RJoint−IGTW is
(R1s +R2s)Joint ≤1
2
log
(P1 +N2)(P2 +N1)Ne
N2N1(P1 + P2 +Ne)
. (28)
By (27), the sum-rate R1s +R2s with the individual secrecy satisfies
(R1s +R2s)Ind ≤1
2
log
(P1 +N2)(P2 +N1)(P1 +Ne)(P2 +Ne)
N1N2(P1 + P2 +Ne)(P1 + P2 +Ne)
. (29)
Such that
(R1s +R2s)Joint − (R1s +R2s)Ind =1
2
log
Ne(P1 + P2 +Ne)
(P1 +Ne)(P2 +Ne)
=
1
2
log
1
1 + P1Ne
× (1 + P1
P2 +Ne
)
<0
Theoretically, the sum-rate R1s +R2s with the individual secrecy is strictly larger than that with the joint secrecy, hence it is
consistent with the numerical results in Fig. 7.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the fundamental limits of two-way wiretap channel with individual secrecy. Firstly, by channel
prefixing approach and stochastic encoding, we derived an achievable secrecy rate region for the general two-way wiretap
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channel. Secondly, we obtained outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region for the general two-way wiretap channel and for
two classes of special two-way wiretap channels. The result showed that the individual secrecy creates an advantage over the
joint secrecy for the achievable secrecy rate region in a binary modulo-2 two-way channel, where the region with individual
secrecy was shown to be twice as large as that with joint secrecy. Particularly, the inner and the outer bound coincide with each
other in XOR channel and degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channel, hence the secrecy capacity regions were established.
In addition, in the degraded Gaussian two-way wiretap channel, the individual secrecy gains larger secure sum-rate than the
joint secrecy does.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2, 3 AND 4
In order to give the achievable reliable transmission rate region R and the secrecy rate region RJoint−Ins and RIndi−Ins ,
we first calculate the following terms.
• I(X1;Y2|X2) and I(X2;Y1|X1):
I(X1;Y2|X2)
=H(Y2|X2)−H(Y2|X1, X2)
≤1−
∑
x2
p(x2)H(Y2|X1, x2)
=1− h(y2 6= x1|x2)
=1− h(ε2)
Similarly, we have
I(X2;Y1|X1) ≤1− h(ε1);
• I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y1|X1)− I(X1, X2;Z):
I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y1|X1)− I(X1, X2;Z)
=H(Y2|X2) +H(Y1|X1)−H(Z)−H(Y2|X1X2)−H(Y1|X1X2) +H(Z|X1X2)
By noting that,
H(Y2|X2) +H(Y1|X1)−H(Z)
=H(X1 ⊕N2) +H(X2 ⊕N1)−H(X1 ⊕X2 ⊕Ne)
(a)
=H(X1 ⊕N2) +H(X2 ⊕N1)−H(X1 ⊕N2 ⊕X2 ⊕N1 ⊕ Nˆe)
(b)
≤H(X1 ⊕N2) +H(X2 ⊕N1)−H(X1 ⊕N2 ⊕X2 ⊕N1)
=H(X1 ⊕N2) +H(X1 ⊕N2 ⊕X2 ⊕N1|X1 ⊕N2)−H(X1 ⊕N2 ⊕X2 ⊕N1)
=H(X1 ⊕N2)− I(X1 ⊕N2 ⊕X2 ⊕N1;X1 ⊕N2)
=H(X1 ⊕N2|X1 ⊕N2 ⊕X2 ⊕N1)
≤1 (30)
where (a) follows by setting Nˆe = N1 ⊕N2 ⊕Ne; (b) follows from the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy.
Hence, we conclude that
I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y1|X1)− I(X1, X2;Z)
(c)
≤1−H(Y2|X1X2)−H(Y1|X1X2) +H(Z|X1X2)
(d)
=1− h(ε1)− h(ε2) + h(εz)
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where (c) follows from (30); (d) follows from H(Y2|X1X2) = h(ε2), H(Y1|X1X2) = h(ε1), and H(Z|X1X2) = h(εz).
• I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X1;Z) and I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X1;Z):
I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X1;Z)
=I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Z|X1)− I(X1, X2;Z)
=H(Y2|X2) +H(Z|X1)−H(Z)−H(Y2|X1X2)−H(Z|X1X2) +H(Z|X1X2)
=H(Y2|X2) +H(Z|X1)−H(Z)−H(Y2|X1X2)
(e)
≤1− h(ε2)
where (e) follows from the same process as (30), and H(Y2|X1X2) = h(ε2).
Similarly, we have
I(X2;Y1|X1)− I(X2;Z) ≤1− h(ε1).
Based on these items above, the reliable transmission rate given by Shannon [7], the achievable reliable transmission rate
pair (R1, R2) satisfies
R1s ≤I(X1;Y2|X2) ≤ 1− h(ε2),
R2s ≤I(X2;Y1|X1) ≤ 1− h(ε1).
According to the results in previous work [11], we can obtain the achievable rate pair (R1s, R2s) for the deterministic
modulo-2 two-way wiretap channel with the joint secrecy as
R1s ≤I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X1;Z) ≤ 1− h(ε2),
R2s ≤I(X2;Y1|X1)− I(X2;Z) ≤ 1− h(ε1),
R1s +R2s ≤I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y1|X1)− I(X1, X2;Z) ≤ 1 + h(εz)− h(ε1)− h(ε2).
By Theorem 1, the secrecy rate pair (R1s, R2s) with the individual secrecy for the modulo-2 binary two-way wiretap channel
satisfies
R1s ≤I(X2;Y1|X1)− I(X2;Z) ≤ 1− h(ε2),
R2s ≤I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X1;Z) ≤ 1− h(ε1).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
With fixed probability density function p(u1) and p(u2), the codebooks are generated as follows.
1) Codebook generation: According to p(ui), the user i, (i = 1, 2), randomly generates 2nRi independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d) sequences uni (wis, wir), with (wis, wir) ∈ [1 : 2nRis ]× [1 : 2nRir ]. Note that
Ri = Ris +Rir. (31)
When analysing the secrecy measurement 1nH(W1s|Zn), if R2 ≥ I(U2;Z|U1) then the codebook of user 2 is equally
partitioned into 2R21 parts with R21 = R2−I(U2;Z|U1)+′, each part consisting of 2R22 codewords with R22 = I(U2;Z|U1)−
′. Correspondingly, for the secrecy analysis of 1nH(W2s|Zn), if R1 ≥ I(U1;Z|U2) then the codebook of of user 1 is
equally partitioned into 2R11 parts with R11 = R1 − I(U1;Z|U2) + ′, each part consisting of 2R12 codewords with R12 =
I(U1;Z|U2)− ′.
2) Encoding: To send message w1s, user 1 randomly chooses w1r ∈ [1 : 2nR1r ], finds un1 (w1s, w1r), generates xn1 according
to p(x1|u1) and sends xn1 to the channel. Similarly, to send message w2s, user 2 randomly chooses w2r ∈ [1 : 2nR2r ], finds
un2 (w2s, w2r), generates x
n
2 according to p(x2|u2) and sends xn2 to the channel.
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3) Decoding: User 1 declares that wˆ2s is sent by user 2 if un2 (wˆ2s, wˆ2r) is the unique sequence such that (u
n
2 (wˆ2s, wˆ2r), x
n
1 , y
n
1 ) ∈
Tn . User 2 declares that wˆ1s is sent by user 1 if u
n
1 (wˆ1s, wˆ1r) is the unique sequence such that (u
n
1 (wˆ1s, wˆ1r), x
n
2 , y
n
2 ) ∈ Tn .
4) Reliability Analysis: Based on the AEP and packing lemma [18], for sufficiently large n, the average error probability
of Pe,1 and Pe,2 goes to zero, if
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y2|X2)− 4, R2 ≤ I(U2;Y1|X1)− 4. (32)
5) individual secrecy analysis: Firstly, we consider the equivocation of W1s as follows.
H(W1s|Zn)
=H(W1s,W1r,W2s, U
n
1 , U
n
2 |Zn)−H(W1r,W2s, Un1 , Un2 |W1s, Zn)
(a)
=H(W1s,W1r,W2s, U
n
1 , U
n
2 )− I(Un1 , Un2 ;Zn)−H(W1r,W2s, Un1 , Un2 |W1s, Zn)
(b)
=n(R1s +R1r +R2)− nI(U1, U2;Z)− nεn −H(W1r,W2s, Un1 , Un2 |W1s, Zn) (33)
where (a) follows from the Markov chain (W1s,W1r,W2s)→ (Un1 , Un2 )→ Zn, such that I(W1s,W1r,W2s, Un1 , Un2 ;Zn) =
I(Un1 , U
n
2 ;Z
n); (b) follows from H(W1s,W1r,W2s, Un1 , U
n
2 ) = H(U
n
1 , U
n
2 ), hence according to the codebook construction
H(W1s,W1r,W2s, U
n
1 , U
n
2 ) = n(R1s +R1r +R2).
And I(Un1 , U
n
2 ;Z
n) ≤ nI(U1, U2;Z) + nεn, which follows a similar proof of [19, Lemma 3].
Then the last term H(W1r,W2s|W1s, Zn) in (33) can be bounded in two different cases as follows.
1) If R2 ≤ I(U2;Z|U1), then
H(W1r,W2s, U
n
1 , U
n
2 |W1s, Zn)
(c)
≤ n′, (34)
where (c) follows from the Fano’s inequality by taking
R1r +R2 ≤ I(U1, U2;Z)− . (35)
Replacing the third terms in (33) by (34), we obtain
H(W1s|Zn)
≥n[R1s +R1r +R2]− nI(U1, U2;Z)− nn − n′
(d)
≥nR1s − n(n + ′),
where (d) follows by taking
R1r +R2 ≥ I(U1, U2;Z)− 2. (36)
By (35) and (36), we have
R1r +R2 = I(U1, U2;Z). (37)
2) If R2 ≥ I(U2;Z|U1), then
H(W1r,W2s, U
n
1 , U
n
2 |W1s, Zn)
=H(Un1 , U
n
2 |W1s, Zn)
=H(Un1 |W1s, Zn) +H(Un2 |W1s, Zn, Un1 )
(e)
≤n′ + n[R2 − I(U2;Z|U1)] + n′ (38)
where (e) follows from the Fano’s inequality by taking
R1r ≤ I(U1;Z)− . (39)
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The second term H(Un2 |W1s, Zn, Un1 ) is bounded as follows. Since R2 ≥ I(U2;Z|U1), we consider the codebook by
rate splitting as explained in 1) codebook generation. Therefore, we have
H(Un2 |W1s, Zn, Un1 )
=H(W21,W22|W1s, Un1 , Zn)
=H(W21|W1s,W1r, Zn) +H(W22|W21,W1s, Un1 , Zn)
(f)
≤nR21 + n′
=n[R2 − I(U2;Z|U1)] + n′,
where (f) follows from H(W21|W1s,W1r, Zn) ≤ H(W21) = nR21; H(W22|W21,W1s, Un1 , Zn) ≤ n′ holds by the
Fano’s inequality by taking R22 ≤ I(U2;Z|U1), which is due to the structure of the codebook.
Replacing the last term in (33) by (38), we obtain
H(W1s|Zn)
≥n(R1s +R1r +R2)− nI(U1, U2;Z)− nn
− [n(R2 − I(U2;Z|U1))] + 2n′)
(g)
≥nR1s − n(n + 2′),
where (g) follows from
R1r ≥ I(U1;Z)− 2. (40)
By (39) and (40), we have
R1r = I(U1;Z). (41)
Combining (37) and (41) into a more compact form, R1r can be rewritten as
R1r = I(U1;Z) + |I(U2;Z|U1)−R2|+. (42)
Following from a similar analysis of 1nH(W2s|Zn), we have
R2r = I(U2;Z) + |I(U1;Z|U2)−R1|+. (43)
6) secrecy rate analysis: Considering the reliability and the individual secrecy analysis, we obtained (31), (32), (42), (43).
After the Fourier-Motzkin elimination, the achievable secrecy rate region is the union of non-negative rate pair (R1s, R2s)
satisfying 
R1s, R2s ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ I(U1;Y2|X2)− I(U1;Z)− |I(U2;Z|U1)− I(U2;Y2|X2)|+,
R2s ≤ I(U2;Y1|X1)− I(U2;Z)− |I(U1;Z|U2)− I(U1;Y1|X1)|+.

APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof:
First, we define the following auxiliary random variables to proceed to R1s.
Ui = X
i−1
2 Y
i−1
2 Z
n
i+1, V1i = (W1s, Ui), V2i = (W2s, Ui) (44)
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nR1s =H(W1s) ≤ H(W1s|Zn) + n
=H(W1s|Zn)−H(W1s|Y n2 , Xn2 ) +H(W1s|Y n2 , Xn2 ) + n
=H(W1s)− I(W1s;Zn)−H(W1s) + I(W1s;Y n2 , Xn2 ) +H(W1s|Y n2 Xn2 ) + n
=− I(W1s;Zn) + I(W1s;Y n2 , Xn2 ) +H(W1s|Y n2 , Xn2 ) + n
(a)
≤ I(W1s;Xn2 , Y n2 )− I(W1s;Zn) + n+ nδn
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1s;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 )− I(W1s;Zi|Zni+1)] + n+ nδn
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1s, Z
n
i+1;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 )− I(Zni+1;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 ,W1s) + n+ nδn
− I(W1s, Xi−12 , Y i−12 ;Zi|Zni+1) + I(Xi−12 , Y i−12 ;Zi|Zni+1,W1s)] + n+ nδn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1s, Z
n
i+1;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 )− I(W1s, Xi−12 , Y i−12 ;Zi|Zni+1)] + n+ nδn
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Zni+1;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 ) + I(W1s;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 , Zni+1)
− I(Xi−12 , Y i−12 ;Zi|Zni+1)− I(W1s;Zi|Xi−12 , Y i−12 Zni+1)] + n+ nδn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1s;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 , Zni+1)− I(W1s;Zi|Xi−12 , Y i−12 , Zni+1)] + n+ nδn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(V1i;X2i, Y2i|Ui)− I(V1i;Zi|Ui)] + n+ nδn
(d)
=n[I(V1;X2, Y2|U)− I(V1;Z|U)] + n+ nδn
where (a) follows by the Fano’s inequality; (b) follows from the Csisza´r sum identity [11]; (c) follows from the definition
Ui = (X
i−1
2 , Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1) and V1i = (W1s, Ui) in (45); and (d) follows from the standard procedure of introducing a time-
sharing random variable.
Similarly, we can obtain
R2s ≤I(V2;X1, Y1|U)− I(V2;Z|U) + + δn
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof:
19
1) For the two-way wiretap channels with Y1 = Y2 = Z, we first derive the outer bound of R1s.
nR1s ≤H(W1s|Zn) + n
(a)
=H(W1s|Y n)−H((W1s|Xn2 Y n) +H(W1s|Xn2 Y n) + n
=I(W1s;X
n
2 |Y n) +H(W1s|Xn2 Y n) + n
(b)
≤I(W1s;Xn2 |Y n) + n1 + n
≤I(W1sXn1 ;Xn2 |Y n) + n1 + n
=I(Xn1 ;X
n
2 |Y n) + I(W1s;Xn2 |Y nXn1 ) + n1 + n
(c)
=I(Xn1 ;X
n
2 |Y n) + n1 + n
=I(Xn1 ;X
n
2 Y
n)− I(Xn1 ;Y n) + n1 + n
(d)
=I(Xn1 ;Y
n|Xn2 )− I(Xn1 ;Y n) + n1 + n
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Xn1 ;Yi|Xn2 Y i−1)− I(Xn1 ;Yi|Y i−1)] + n1 + n
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi|Xn2 Y i−1)−H(Yi|Xn1Xn2 Y i−1)−H(Yi|Y i−1) +H(Yi|Y i−1Xn1 )] + n1 + n
(e)
≤
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi|X2iY i−1)−H(Yi|X1iX2i)−H(Yi|Y i−1) +H(Yi|X1iY i−1)] + n1 + n
=
n∑
i=1
[I(X1i;Yi|X2iY i−1)− I(X1i;Yi|Y i−1)] + n1 + n
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(X1i;Yi|X2iQi, J = i)− I(X1i;Yi|Qi, J = i)] + n1 + n
(g)
≤n[I(X1;Y |X2, Q)− I(X1;Y |Q)] + n1 + n
where (a) follows from Y1 = Y2 = Z = Y ; (b) follows from Fano’s inequality by taking R1 ≤ I(X1;Y2X2); (c) follows
from the coding scheme; (d) follows from the independence of X1i, X2i; the first and the last term of (e) follow that
conditioning does not increase entropy, and the second term of (e) follows that Yi is independent of everything else
given X1i, X2i (Markov chain Y i−1 → (X1i, X2i) → Yi); (f) follows from the definition of Qi = Y i−1 and J = i;
(g) follows from that J is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Similarly, we can obtain the outer bound R2s ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Q)− I(X1;Y |Q).
2) For the second class of channels, first, we define the following auxiliary random variables to proceed to R1s.
Qi = Z
i−1. (45)
20
nR1s ≤H(W1s|Zn) + n
=H(W1s|Zn)−H((W1s|Xn2 Y n2 Zn) +H(W1s|Xn2 Y n2 Zn) + n
=I(W1s;X
n
2 Y
n
2 |Zn) +H(W1s|Xn2 Y n2 Zn) + n
(a)
≤ I(W1s;Xn2 Y n2 |Zn) + n1 + n
≤I(W1sXn1 ;Xn2 Y n2 |Zn) + n1 + n
=I(Xn1 ;X
n
2 Y
n
2 |Zn) + I(W1s;Xn2 Y n2 |ZnXn1 ) + n1 + n
(b)
=I(Xn1 ;X
n
2 Y
n
2 |Zn) + n1 + n
=H(Xn1 |Zn)−H(Xn1 |Xn2 Y n2 Zn) + n1 + n
(c)
=H(Xn1 |Zn)−H(Xn1 |Xn2 Y n2 ) + n1 + n
=I(Xn1 ;X
n
2 Y
n
2 )− I(Xn1 ;Zn) + n1 + n
=I(Xn1 ;Y
n
2 |Xn2 )− I(Xn1 ;Zn) + n1 + n (46)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Xn1 ;Y2i|Y i−12 Xn2 )− I(Xn1 ;Zi|Zi−1)] + n1 + n
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Y2i|Y i−12 Xn2 )−H(Y2i|Y i−12 Xn1Xn2 )−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|Zi−1Xn1 )] + n1 + n
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Y2i|Y i−12 Xn2 Zi−1)−H(Y2i|Y i−12 Xn1Xn2 Zi−1)−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|Zi−1Xn1 )] + n1 + n
(e)
≤
n∑
i=1
[H(Y2i|Xn2 Zi−1)−H(Y2i|X1iX2iZi−1)−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|Zi−1Xn1 )] + n1 + n
(f)
≤
n∑
i=1
[H(Y2i|X2iZi−1)−H(Y2i|X1iX2iZi−1)−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|Zi−1X1i)] (47)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(X1i;Y2i|X2iZi−1)− I(X1i;Zi|Zi−1)] + n1 + n
(g)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(X1i;Y2i|X2iQi, J = i)− I(X1i;Zi|Qi, J = i)] + n1 + n
(h)
≤n[I(X1;Y2|X2, Q)− I(X1;Z|Q)] + n1 + n
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality by taking R1 ≤ I(X1;X2Y2); (b) follows from the coding scheme; (c) follows
from the degraded condition, i.e. Zn is degraded of Y n2 ; (d) follows from the degraded condition, i.e. Z
n is degraded
of Y n2 ; the first term of (e) follows that conditioning does not increase entropy, and the second term of (e) follows that
Y2i is independent of everything else given X1i, X2i (Markov chain Zi−1 → (X1i, X2i)→ Y2i); (f) follows from that
conditioning does not increase entropy; (g) follows from the definition of Qi = Zi−1 and J = i; (h) follows from that
J is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Similarly, we can obtain
R2s ≤H(Y1i|X1iZi−1)−H(Y1i|X1iX2iZi−1)−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|Zi−1X2i) (48)
≤I(X2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(X2;Z|Q).
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A. Proof of the Achievability
Let U1 ∼ N(0, (1−α)P1), U2 ∼ N(0, (1−β)P2), X ′1 ∼ N(0, αP1), X ′2 ∼ N(0, βP2), and U1, U2, X ′1, X ′2 are independent
with each other. X1 = U1 +X ′1, X2 = U2 +X
′
2. The achievability proof follows by calculating the mutual information terms
in Theorem 1 with the above definitions. Hence, the achievable secrecy rate region is
RInGTW M=
⋃
α,β∈[0,1]

(R1s, R2s) :
R1s ≥ 0, R2s ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ 1
2
log
(P1 +N2)(αP1 + P2 +Ne)
(αP1 +N2)(P1 + P2 +Ne)
,
R2s ≤ 1
2
log
(P2 +N1)(P1 + βP2 +Ne)
(βP2 +N1)(P1 + P2 +Ne)
.

(49)
Further considering the convex hull operation, the maximum achievable secrecy rate region RInGTW is achieved when α = 0,
β = 0, i.e.
RInGTW M=

(R1s, R2s) :
R1s ≥ 0, R2s ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ 1
2
log
(P1 +N2)(P2 +Ne)
N2(P1 + P2 +Ne)
,
R2s ≤ 1
2
log
(P2 +N1)(P1 +Ne)
N1(P1 + P2 +Ne)
.

(50)
B. Proof of the Converse
We further derive the outer bound on the secrecy rate region. From (47), we have
nR1s ≤
n∑
i=1
[H(Y2i|X2iZi−1)−H(Yi|X1iX2iZi−1)−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|X1iZi−1)] + n1
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Y2i|X2iQi)−H(Y2i|X1iX2iQi)−H(Zi|Qi) +H(Zi|X1iQi)]−H(Zn) + n1
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Y2i|X2iQi)−H(Y2i|X1iX2iQi) +H(Zi|X1iQi)]−H(Zn) + n1
In order to obtain the outer bound on the secrecy rate region of Gaussian two-way wiretap channels, firstly we calculate the
following series of entropy.
• We derive the entropy of H(Zi|X1iQi), H(Zi|X2iQi). Firstly,
H(Zi|X1iQi)
(a)
≥h(Zi|X1iX2iQi)
=
1
2
log 2pieNe
where (a) follows from that conditioning does not increase entropy.
On the other hand,
H(Zi|X1iQi)
(b)
≤h(Zi|X1i)
=h(X1i +X2i +Ne|X1i)
≤h(X2i +Ne)
=
1
2
log 2pie(P2 +Ne)
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where (b) follows from that conditioning does not increase entropy.
Such that there exists some β ∈ [0, 1] such that
H(Zi|X1iQi) =1
2
log 2pie[Ne + α(P2 +Ne −Ne)]
=
1
2
log 2pie(βP2 +Ne) (51)
Similarly, we have some β ∈ [0, 1] such that
H(Zi|X2iQi) = 1
2
log 2pie(αP1 +Ne) (52)
• We derive the entropy of H(Y2i|X2iQi) and H(Y1i|X1iQi).
By the entropy power inequality, we obtain
22h(Zi|X1i=x1i,Qi=qi) =22h(Y1i+Z
′
1i|X1i=x1i,Qi=qi)
≥22h(Y1i|X1i=x1i,Qi=qi) + 22h(Z′1i|X1i=x1i,Qi=qi)
=22h(Y1i|X1i=x1i,Qi=qi) + 2pie(Ne −N1)
That is
h(Zi|X1i = x1i, Qi = qi) ≥ 1
2
log[22h(Y1i|X1i=x1i,Qi=qi) + 2pie(Ne −N1)]
Taking the expectation on both sides of the preceding equation, we have
h(Zi|X1i, Qi) =Eh(Zi|X1i = x1i, Qi = qi)
≥1
2
E log[22h(Y1i|X1i=x1i,Qi=qi) + 2pie(Ne −N1)]
(c)
≥ 1
2
log[22Eh(Y1i|X1i=x1i,Qi=qi) + 2pie(Ne −N1)]
=
1
2
log[22h(Y1i|X1i,Qi) + 2pie(Ne −N1)]
where (c) follows from Jensen’s inequality.
By (51),
1
2
log 2pie(βP2 +Ne) =h(Zi|X1i, Qi) ≥ n
2
log[22h(Y1i|X1i,Qi) + 2pie(Ne −N1)]
i.e. 2pie(βP2 +Ne) ≥22h(Y1i|X1i,Qi) + 2pie(Ne −N1)
h(Y1i|X1i, Qi) ≤1
2
log 2pie(βP2 +N1) (53)
Similarly, we have
h(Y2i|X2i, Qi) ≤1
2
log 2pie(αP1 +N2) (54)
• We derive the entropy of H(Y1i|X1iX2iQi) and H(Y2i|X1iX2iQi).
H(Y1i|X1iX2iQi) = H(Y1i|X1iX2i) = 1
2
log 2pieN1 (55)
H(Y2i|X1iX2iQi) = H(Y2i|X1iX2i) = 1
2
log 2pieN2 (56)
• We derive the entropy of H(Zn).
By [20, Lemma 1] or [3, Lemma 10], let g(P ) = 12 log(2pieP ),
H(Xn1 +X
n
2 ) = H(X
n
1 ) +H(X
n
2 ) =
n
2
log 2pie(P1 + P2) = ng(P1 + P2) = nυ.
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Since Zn = Xn1 +X
n
2 + Z
n
e , then
H(Zn) ≥ng(Ne + g−1(υ))
=ng(Ne + g
−1(g(P1 + P2)))
=ng(Ne + P1 + P2)
=
n
2
log 2pie(Ne + P1 + P2) (57)
Hence,
nR1s ≤
n∑
i=1
[H(Y2i|X2iQi)−H(Y2i|X1iX2iQi) +H(Zi|X1iQi)]−H(Zn) + n1
(d)
≤ n
2
log 2pie(αP1 +N2)− n
2
log 2pieN2 +
n
2
log 2pie(βP2 +Ne)− n
2
log 2pie(Ne + P1 + P2)
=
n
2
log
(αP1 +N2)(βP2 +Ne)
N2(Ne + P1 + P2)
where (d) follows by substituting (54), (56), (51) and (57).
Similarly,
nR2s ≤
n∑
i=1
[H(Y1i|X1iQi)−H(Y1i|X1iX2iQi) +H(Zi|X2iQi)]−H(Zn) + n1
(a)
≤ n
2
log 2pie(βP2 +N1)− n
2
log 2pieN1 +
n
2
log 2pie(αP1 +Ne)− n
2
log 2pie(Ne + P1 + P2)
=
n
2
log
(βP2 +N1)(αP1 +Ne)
N1(Ne + P1 + P2)
Hence, the outer bound on secrecy capacity region is
ROGTW M=
⋃
α,β∈[0,1]

(R1s, R2s) :
R1s ≥ 0, R2s ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ 1
2
log
(αP1 +N2)(βP2 +Ne)
N2(Ne + P1 + P2)
,
R2s ≤ 1
2
log
(βP2 +N1)(αP1 +Ne)
N1(Ne + P1 + P2)
.

(58)
Further considering the convex hull of α, β ∈ [0, 1], the outer bound on the secrecy rate region is rewritten by α = β = 1 as
ROGTW M=

(R1s, R2s) :
R1s ≥ 0, R2s ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ 1
2
log
(P1 +N2)(P2 +Ne)
N2(Ne + P1 + P2)
,
R2s ≤ 1
2
log
(P2 +N1)(P1 +Ne)
N1(Ne + P1 + P2)
.

(59)
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